Concept for an Onboard Integrated PNT Unit by Ziebold, Ralf et al.
 Concept for an Onboard Integrated PNT Unit 
R. Ziebold, Z. Dai, T. Noack & E. Engler 
Institute of Communications and Navigation, German Aerospace Centre (DLR), Neustrelitz, Germany 
 
ABSTRACT: A robust electronic position, navigation and timing system (PNT) is considered as one of the 
core elements for the realization of IMO-s (International Maritime Organization) e-Navigation strategy. Ro-
bustness can be interpreted as the capability of an integrated PNT system to provide PNT relevant data with 
the desired accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability under consideration of changing application condi-
tions and requirements. Generally an integrated PNT system is a composite of service components – like 
GNSS, Augmentation Systems and terrestrial Navigation Systems – and an on-board integrated PNT Unit, 
which uses the available navigation and augmentation signals in combination with additional data of sensors 
aboard to provide accurate and robust PNT information of the ship. In this paper a concept of such an on-
board integrated PNT Unit will be presented, which is designed to fulfill the specific user requirements for 
civil waterway applications. At first, the user requirements for an integrated PNT Unit will be overviewed. 
After that, existing integrity monitoring approaches will be analyzed. Finally, a first integration scheme for an 
integrated PNT Unit will be presented with a special focus on the internal integrity monitoring concept. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The maritime integrated PNT System (Figure 1) is 
the sum of satellite-based, ashore and aboard com-
ponents. The integrated use of these components en-
ables the accurate and reliable provision of position, 
navigation and timing data to all maritime applica-
tions. 
Position fixing systems are identified as one 
strategic key element of e-navigation [1]. Existing 
and future Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
(GNSS) like GPS, GLONASS and GALILEO are 
fundamental infrastructures for global positioning. 
Additionally, terrestrial services are used or consid-
ered as candidates to improve the positioning per-
formance (augmentation services: e.g. IALA Beacon 
DGNSS, RTK) or to ensure the backup functionality 
(backup services: e.g. e-LORAN, R-Mode) respec-
tively to GNSS. Due to their interoperability and 
compatibility these systems can be used alternatively 
or complementary for positioning, navigation and 
timing. 
The International Association of Marine Aids to 
Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) has 
introduced the term “integrated PNT device” to de-
scribe the on-board part of maritime, integrated PNT 
system. In [2] the integrated PNT device is described 
as “a device using any available IMO recognized ra-
dio navigation systems simultaneously to provide the 
best electronic position fix for the ship”. Following 
this definition, the outlined objective of the PNT de-
vice is focused on the provision of position informa-
tion to different applications. Several performance 
standards for shipborne GNSS and DGNSS receivers 
were developed and approved by IMO in the last 
decade: GPS [3], GLONASS [4], DGPS and 
DGLONASS [5], combined GPS/GLONASS [6], 
and GALILEO [7]. A logical consequence of this 
standardization process could be the preparation of a 
new performance standard for a multi-system radio 
navigation receiver as core element of the on-board 
part of the PNT System (Figure 1). A more gener-
ally admitted approach can be achieved by the in-
troduction of the PNT Unit. 
The on-board PNT Unit aims at the provision of 
position, navigation and timing data in accordance 
with specified performance requirements, which 
change during berth to berth navigation. The core of 
the on-board PNT Unit is a value-added processing 
system using available radio navigation systems and 
services in combination with on-board sensors for 
accurate and reliable PNT-data provision. The on-
board PNT Unit is on the one hand part of the inte-
grated PNT system and on the other hand part of the 
on-board Integrated Navigation System (INS). 
 
 
Figure 1. Integrated PNT System (dark grey: standard, light grey: considered options) 
 
Due to user needs such as “Indication and Im-
provement of Reliability” and “Alarm Management” 
[1] identified within the framework of the e-
Navigation process, a more general approach for the 
on-board part of the integrated PNT system shall be 
aimed. Reasons for this perspective are on the one 
hand the need for redundancy to improve the robust-
ness of PNT-information and to enable the assess-
ment of accuracy by suitable integrity monitoring 
functions. On the other hand the type of implement-
able redundancy (equipment, different measurement 
methods, over determined systems, alternative appli-
cable techniques) specifies the potential of error de-
tection, identification and mitigation. 
2 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS AND 
SENSORS 
2.1 Technical requirements 
In [8] the aim of GNSS is described as a system to 
provide worldwide position, velocity and time de-
termination for multimodal use. An operational re-
quirement indicates the tasks of shipborne GNSS de-
vices in the provision of position, time, course and 
speed over ground. But in Appendix 2 and 3 of the 
same document minimum maritime user require-
ments are only given for horizontal position. Other-
wise the use of the item Electronic Position Fixing 
System (EPFS) in [9] implicates that the scope of 
GNSS is rather the provision of position data than 
the provision of PNT data. 
The analysis of these documents shows the neces-
sity to clarify and define the extent of PNT data, 
which should be delivered by a maritime PNT Unit. 
In a preliminary design, the following parameters 
should be considered: 
1 Position: It mainly contains the longitude and 
latitude for maritime navigations. Because vessels 
can usually be found close to the sea level, the 
height information is usually not provided as 
standard output parameter. 
2 Under keel clearance (UKC): Instead of the height 
information, the UKC is the relevant maritime 
output parameter. It is defined as the distance be-
tween the lowest point of the ship (e.g. the keel) 
and the ground of the sea. 
3 Velocity: The magnitude and direction of a veloc-
ity vector can be described by Speed over Ground 
(SOG) and Course over Ground (COG). Because 
of their physical principles, speed sensors like e.g. 
electro-magnetic logs can only measure the speed 
through water (STW), and therefore STW is also 
a parameter which a PNT Unit could deliver. 
4 Attitude: Generally the orientation of the ship in 
the horizontal plane is reported. Here one needs to 
distinguish between the orientation with respect to 
the true north (true heading) and with respect to 
the magnetic north (heading). For future applica-
tions, the other attitude angles, namely roll and 
pitch, could also be required. 
5 Timing: UTC time needs to be delivered. 
 
After the clarification of the PNT output parame-
ters, further additional requirements on the PNT Unit 
will be discussed in the following. 
In [1], the robustness of all e-navigation systems 
is requested. In order to fulfill this requirement, a 
definition of robustness needs to be given. We inter-
pret robustness as the ability of a system to provide 
the output data according to their specification under 
changing application conditions and in cases of ex-
ternal disturbances (interferences, jamming, atmos-
pheric influences). The robustness shall therefore be 
applicable to the realization of the basic functional-
 
 ity (output data with required accuracy) and integrity 
functionality. 
In [1] it is furthermore stated, that requirements 
for redundancy, particularly in relation to position 
fixing systems, should be considered. Redundancy in 
a general meaning can be seen as the provision of an 
alternative system to support critical system function-
alities. Within the Recommendation R-129 on GNSS 
Vulnerability and Mitigation Measures [10] IALA 
has given a classification of alternative navigation 
systems in relation to their aims: 
1 A redundant system provides the same function-
ality as the primary system, allowing a seamless 
transition with no change in procedures. 
2 A backup system ensures continuation of the 
navigation application, but not necessarily with 
the full functionality of the primary system and 
may necessitate some change in procedures by the 
user. 
3 A contingency system allows safe completion of 
a manoeuvre, but may not be adequate for long-
term use. 
For the introduction of additional sensors to the 
integrated PNT Unit, this classification scheme needs 
to be considered. 
2.2 Standard sensors for the provision of PNT data 
According to the carriage requirement demanded by 
the IMO Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention 
[11], following sensors (see Table 1) should be used 
in maritime applications. An overview of the sensors 
and a discussion of the related standards can be 
found in [12]. Therefore here only a table with the 
list of standard sensors with typical output data and 
realizations are given. 
 
TABLE 1. STANDARD PNT SENSORS 
Sensor Output Typical realization 
Speed through water  
(STW) 
Electromagnetic 
logs 
 
Speed log [13] 
Speed over ground 
(SOG) 
Doppler logs 
True heading Gyrocompass Compass [14] 
[15] Magnetic heading Magnetic compass 
Electronic Posi-
tion Fixing Sys-
tem (EPFS) 
Position 
Speed over Ground 
(SOG) 
Course over ground 
(COG) 
Time 
GPS/GLONASS 
DGPS/DGLONASS
receiver and antenna
Transmitting 
Heading Device 
[16] (THD) 
 
Heading 
GNSS multi- an-
tenna system 
Echo sounder 
[17] 
UKC Sonar 
Rate of Turn 
Indicator [18] 
(ROTI) 
 
ROT 
 
Mechanical Gyro 
 
3 ACCURACY ASSESSMENT AND INTEGRITY 
MONITORING 
3.1 Integrity Definition 
One of the key tasks of an integrated PNT Unit is the 
additional provision of integrity messages to the us-
er. Within the specification of requirements for fu-
ture GNSS [8] IMO has given the following defini-
tion of in integrity: The ability to provide users with 
warnings within a specified time when the system 
should not be used for navigation. Within that defini-
tion the alert limit specifies the applicable threshold 
differing between an unusable or unusable system. 
The time to alarm (TTA) describes the acceptable 
time duration between occurrence of an intolerable 
error and the provision of the related integrity mes-
sage. The remaining integrity risk (IR) specifies the 
tolerable probability, that the assessment of accuracy 
by integrity monitoring is erroneous. This definition 
implies an integrity monitoring process wherein the 
accuracy of the given navigation parameter needs to 
be estimated in real time and compared against a 
given threshold (alert limit). In other words, an er-
ror estimation of all navigation parameters needs to 
be performed onboard a vessel. 
Integrity monitoring as it is defined for Integrated 
Navigation Systems (INS) consists of the following 
three sequential steps [19]: 
 Plausibility check 
The plausibility check tests whether the sensor 
raw data or derived navigational result falls into 
predefined value range. The plausibility check is 
normally carried out at receiver side in order to 
test the usability of the sensor data. 
 Validity check 
The validity is tested by comparing the sensor data 
or derived navigational results with formal and 
logical criteria as well as by checking the correct-
ness of the data format. The validity check is nor-
mally carried out at the sensor site in order to en-
sure the proper operation of the sensor. 
 Compatibility check 
Once a specific parameter can be provided by 
more than one sensor, different sensor data can be 
compared to test the compatibility. A significant 
discrepancy between different sensor data implies 
the failure of at least one of these sensors. The 
upper bound for deviation should be defined ei-
ther a priori or in real-time according to the previ-
ous measurements. The compatibility test should 
be carried out before sending the sensor data to 
integration algorithm. 
The primary aim of plausibility, validity and 
compatibility checks is the detection of errors. The 
assessment of accuracy requires the implementation 
of suitable integrity monitoring functions. 
3.2 Existing Integrity Monitoring approaches 
In this section existing integrity monitoring ap-
proaches defined for maritime navigation will be de-
scribed and the seen gaps will be discussed. 
3.2.1 Integrity monitoring for GNSS 
3.2.1.1 Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(RAIM) 
RAIM is a technique, which can be applied in 
GNSS receivers to assess the integrity of navigation 
signals [8], if more than 5 GNSS signals are tracked 
[8]. RAIM has two-fold tasks, first is to check the 
occurrence of a failure, and second is to identify er-
roneous satellites. RAIM can be done by using only 
the incoming measurement of current epoch or em-
ploying also measurements of previous epochs. The 
former approach needs the redundant measurement, 
and the performance is dependent on the number of 
satellites in view. In [20], several classic “snapshot” 
algorithms are introduced. 
For a maritime GNSS receiver a RAIM is re-
quested [21], however, neither the algorithm is speci-
fied nor it is defined how the user should react on the 
three possible outputs: safe, caution, and unsafe. Re-
ferring to a “snapshot” RAIM, the a priori knowl-
edge of the observation errors is needed by all exist-
ing algorithms. A proper determination of this term 
for maritime navigation is an open task. 
3.2.1.2 IALA Beacon DGNSS 
GNSS integrity-monitoring services are usually 
part of augmentation services which also provide 
DGNSS corrections. The reason for this shared ac-
tivity is the similarity of the infrastructure required 
for DGNSS and integrity monitoring. 
The IALA Beacon Differential GNSS service is a 
standardized technique for maritime use [22]. The 
implemented integrity monitoring assesses primarily 
the integrity of the service itself, but can also include 
parts of GNSS assessment. At reference station dif-
ferent thresholds are applied to the observed HDOP 
or determined range and range rate corrections to es-
timate the usability of service or single GNSS sig-
nals. Additionally the IALA Beacon DGNSS is 
equipped with one or more integrity monitoring sta-
tions operating as virtual user at known location. On-
ly in case that the observed DGNSS position error is 
below the allowed error threshold, the IALA Beacon 
DGNSS distributes a flag bit to indicate the usability 
of the service. The health status of a satellite is pro-
vided indirectly by embedding the “do not use” flag 
in the transmitted PRC and RRC for an unhealthy 
satellite. 
Spatial decorrelation of provided range and range 
rate corrections, differences in satellite visibility be-
tween station and user sites, and user specific recep-
tion conditions (multipath, interferences) are the 
main causes for discrepancies between the estimated 
and real DGNSS positioning performance. 
3.2.1.3 Maritime GBAS (RTK) 
The preliminary integrity monitoring of the phase 
based Maritime GBAS [23] follows the IALA Bea-
con DGNSS concept. Hence an integrity monitoring 
station (IM) is installed in the service area (ca. 10-
20km) of the reference station (RS). At both stations 
integrity monitoring procedures are processed in 
three steps. In the first step the RS and the IM evalu-
ate the quality of the received GNSS signals on the 
basis of quality parameters like phase and code 
noise. In a second step a GNSS RAIM based position 
determination is realized. The results of both steps 
are compared with pre-specified thresholds to assess 
the usability of single GNSS signals as well as the 
usability of the service of RS and IM station. 
Afterwards the signals without abnormalities from 
the RS and IM are used to calculate the IM position 
by carrier phase based differential techniques (RTK). 
The position error is derived by comparison of the 
computed with the exactly known position of the IM. 
If the accuracy requirements of IMO for port vessel 
operation are fulfilled, the service can be considered 
as usable. 
Finally the M-GBAS logically combines all gath-
ered integrity information at RS and IM site gained 
in the previous steps to generate the RTCM 3 mes-
sages for the provision of augmentation data and re-
lated integrity data (message 4083). 
3.2.1.4 Integrity monitoring for INS 
An INS offers integrated and augmented functions 
to support system tasks like collision avoidance, 
route planning and route monitoring. Currently an 
INS is not a mandatory system, but if an INS is in-
stalled onboard a vessel it is accepted monitoring is 
considered as an intrinsic function of the INS. The 
currently valid INS standard is based on IMO reso-
lution MSC.86 (70) [24] and is specified within the 
IEC-61924 standard [19]. A task oriented concept is 
already introduced in a new resolution MSC.252 (83) 
[25], but the specification within the related IEC 
standard is not yet published. Therefore our analysis 
is based on IEC-61924 standard only. In IEC-
61924 standard, plausibility, validity and compatibil-
ity check approaches are introduced. IEC-61924 
standard suggests the compatibility check for the fol-
lowing navigational parameters. 
1 Position: comparison with a second EPFS; using 
RAIM GNSS function; Dead Reckoning (DR) us-
ing the ship’s heading and speed measuring de-
vice 
2 Heading: comparison with a second heading sen-
sor and a course over ground sensor 
3 SOG: comparison with a second SOG sensor, 
with speed through water sensor and with SOG 
from the EPFS (GNSS) 
 
 4 Time: comparison with a second time sensor and 
with the internal INS clock 
5 UKC: comparison with a second depth sensor and 
with data derived from ships position and elec-
tronic navigational charts (ENC) 
3.3 Demand on specification and development 
The Position, as the most important PNT informa-
tion, currently is measured by only two separate re-
ceiver/antenna GNSS devices. Integrity monitoring 
is restricted to a comparison of the positions deter-
mined by these two receivers. Due to the same 
measurement technique, system and propagation er-
rors of both GNSS devices underlie the similar error 
in the measurement and position domain. 
An estimation of the actual position error is cur-
rently not performed onboard a vessel. Indirectly it is 
assumed, that the horizontal position error is < 100 
m, when using GNSS standard positioning service, 
and <10 m, when using IALA Beacon DGNSS ser-
vice. 
Although positioning accuracy requirement on 
GNSS are specified with respect to different opera-
tional areas [26][8], the integrity monitoring is cur-
rently performed by using fixed or user selectable 
thresholds. In order to use these areas for future in-
tegrity monitoring applications, these areas and the 
intersection from one area to another need to be 
clearly specified in an appropriate way (e.g. in ENC 
charts). 
Furthermore integrity specifications for the other 
PNT parameter (e.g. SOG, COG, time) besides posi-
tion have to be specified. The necessity of an opera-
tional area dependent accuracy and integrity specifi-
cation for these parameters needs to be discussed 
Analyzing the existing integrity monitoring ap-
proaches with respect to the identified user needs [1] 
a demand on the development of an enhanced integ-
rity monitoring for all relevant PNT data within an 
integrated PNT Unit can be deduced. Such a PNT 
Unit should use sensor and data fusion methods to 
ensure the provision of PNT output data with the de-
sired accuracy and to ensure an overall integrity 
monitoring for these output data. For both function-
alities a higher degree of standardization is desired 
in order to achieve comparable results for their har-
monized application. 
4 PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE OF INTEGRITY 
MONITORING IN PNT UNIT 
For a PNT Unit, integrity monitoring can be carried 
out in three sequential steps. The first step is an indi-
vidual sensor data test. The second step is the com-
patibility test of similar data from different sensors. 
The third step is the fault detection and identification 
in the integration algorithm. A general integrity 
monitoring approach is depicted in Figure 2. 
4.1 Integrity monitoring for GNSS 
Actually within an INS, position integrity monitoring 
is performed by comparing the calculated position 
with a second EPFS, by using RAIM GNSS function 
and by using DR technique. Possible improvements 
in a PNT Unit will be elaborated as follows. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. General integrity monitoring approaches in the integrated sensor system
4.2 Compatibility check for redundant GNSS 
systems 
GNSS redundancy can be achieved using a secon-
dary GNSS device, using multiple civilian frequen-
cies and using multiple GNSS constellations. 
Once the major GNSS device (antenna or re-
ceiver) is out of use, the second GNSS device can 
fully take the function of the major GNSS device. 
However, the redundant GNSS device is also af-
fected by the errors related to the radio signal. In this 
sense, the significance of a redundant GNSS device 
is reflected during the internal failure of the major 
GNSS device. 
Modern GNSS satellites will facilitate more than 
one signal. Civilian code data will also be encoded 
into the carrier signal besides L1 signal at future 
GNSS satellites. The additional civilian code data 
will offer the same functionalities like the SPS ser-
vice. Due to different carrier signals, the other car-
rier signals might not suffer from the same interfer-
ence or jamming or propagation effects as L1 signal. 
Also, the channel failure (loss of lock or cycle-slips, 
etc.) for L1 signal might not occur simultaneously on 
the other frequencies. Nevertheless, errors due to 
space atmosphere and signal propagation will influ-
ence all the carrier signals of a satellite. Hardware 
failure of receiver or antenna might also challenge 
the reception of all carrier signals. 
Two or more full-operational GNSS constella-
tions could serve as redundancy for each other, as 
they realize same functions in maritime navigation 
as specified in [26]. However, GLONASS and GAL-
ILEO are not yet fully operational. Future GNSS re-
ceivers and corresponding antennas allow the recep-
tion and processing of multiple GNSS signals, 
however, a hardware failure can cause the loss of all 
GNSS signals. 
4.3 Compatibility check with backup systems 
Systems like e-Loran (enhanced Long Range Navi-
gation) or R-mode (Ranging mode) facilitate the 
functions for positioning. The e-Loran system can 
also be used for time determination, so that these 
systems could serve as backup for GNSS [27]. 
Compared to GNSS, e-Loran signals are transmitted 
at lower frequency with higher power and hence it is 
not easy to be jammed especially not by the same 
GNSS jammers. It relies on the radio signal propa-
gated over ground and hence does not suffer from 
the same errors in the propagation path from sky like 
GNSS. So the future of e-Loran as a terrestrial back-
up for GNSS with a large coverage area is currently 
an open question. Also, the fulfillment of the future 
maritime requirements with respect to the accuracy 
is an issue. 
In [2], the R-Mode is seen as a possible novel 
variant of positioning technique using terrestrial 
signals. The idea is to use existing communication 
channels and append their functionality by sending 
an additional timing signal. From the time differ-
ence between signal transmission and reception, the 
ship should be able to determine its position. The 
advantage of this idea would be that at least partially 
existing infrastructure could be used. Currently this 
is still only an idea, where the proof of concept needs 
to be shown. 
4.4 Compatibility check with contingency system 
The DR is a frequently-used technique to predict the 
position using SOG and COG information. In mari-
time navigation, COG information is usually ap-
proximated by compass. DR is independent of the 
radio signals and hence still works during GNSS 
outage. In a sensor fusion system, DR is already an 
implicit function and does not need to be separately 
implemented. 
Another contingency system can be constructed 
by introducing the inertial sensor. Also the inertial 
sensors are still not standard sensors in maritime 
navigation, they are drawing more and more interests 
due to the independency of radio signals, the short-
term high accuracy, the high output rate and the de-
creasing price. An Inertial Measurement Unit 
(IMU), which is composed of three orthogonal ac-
celerometers and gyroscopes, can offer the naviga-
tion parameters like position, velocity, rate of turn 
and attitude. For this reason, introducing an IMU 
allows the integrity monitoring for relevant sensors. 
A drawback is that the IMU cannot work alone for 
long-term use and hence needs to be integrated with 
other sensors. 
4.5 RAIM 
Classic RAIM algorithms can also be applied to the 
maritime navigation. The only problem is the deter-
mination of the a priori measurement error for pseu-
doranges. This relies on standardized specification 
for different operation areas. If this is not available, 
empirical values have to be used. As an added value 
of the integrated system, an enhanced RAIM aided 
by the antenna dynamics can be implemented. The 
classic “snapshot” RAIM is based on the received 
pseudorange data of current epoch. Once the antenna 
dynamics can be determined, the antenna position 
can be predicted from the position of last epoch. 
This makes the pseudoranges of current epoch pre-
dictable. The predicted pseudoranges serve as addi-
tional observation to enhance the integrity monitor-
ing. 
 
 
 4.6 Integrity monitoring for other independent 
navigation sensors 
4.7.2 Innovation-based approaches 
The innovations indicate the consistency of the  
actual measurements and the measurements predi-
cated by state estimates. Innovation filtering may be 
used to detect large discrepancies immediately, 
whereas innovation sequence monitoring enables 
smaller discrepancies to be detected over time. 
Except for GNSS, the error estimation for navigation 
sensors is difficult as the sensor raw data is not di-
rectly processed. However, the sensor fusion algo-
rithm makes it possible. Once the error estimation of 
one sensor data is available, the fusion algorithm al-
lows the error estimation for other relevant sensors. 
For example, if the error of GNSS- based SOG 
can be properly assessed, the error analysis of speed 
log is also possible. 
4.7.3 Residual-based approaches 
The above-mentioned innovation filtering and se-
quence monitoring can also be expanded to residu-
als. Residuals have a smaller covariance than inno-
vation, making them more sensitive for error 
detection [27]. The only shortcoming is that the 
processing of residuals is not an essential part of a 
Kalman filter routine and needs extra computing 
time. 
4.7 Integrity monitoring in integration algorithm 
The plausibility tests, validity tests and compatibility 
tests are suitable for detecting gross sensor failure 
but not sensitive for slight error, time-variant errors 
and drifts. The Kalman filter-based algorithm could 
offer high sensitivity of detecting these errors. Integ-
rity monitoring based on Kalman filter can be cate-
gorized into the following approaches [27]. 
4.7.4 Parallel solution of multiple sub-filters 
Parallel-solutions integrity monitoring maintains 
a number of parallel navigation solutions or sub-
filters, each excluding data from one sensor or radio 
navigation signal. Each additional navigation solu-
tion is compared with the main filter using a consis-
tency test. A significant inconsistency indicates a 
fault in the sensor or signal omitted from main filter. 
The system output is then switched to the solution 
omitting the faulty sensor or signal. The main draw-
back lies in the increased computational burden and 
hence this technique is preferably used for failure 
identification rather than failure detection 
 
4.7.1 Kalman filter estimates (bias check) 
In a Kalman filter, the errors of navigation pa-
rameters can be estimated. If an estimated error is 
significantly larger than the error level specified by 
the manufacturer, it is likely to be a failure in the 
sensor. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Integrity monitoring in the architecture of a PNT unit 
4.8 Initial design of integrity monitoring in PNT 
Unit 
The major integration strategy of a PNT Unit is the 
integration of GNSS and IMU. An initial design of 
sensor integration in a PNT Unit is depicted in Fig-
ure 3. The plausibility check and compatibility 
check are marked at the corresponding positions in 
the data flow. 
The plausibility check is carried out for gyrocom-
pass, speed log and IMU output. Taking the dynamic 
properties of a specific ship into account, the 
threshold value can be derived for plausibility 
check. 
The compatibility check is first applied to GNSS 
in order to determine the major GNSS antenna (also 
the constellation and signal, if not only one constel-
lation or one signal is to be used). The data of major 
GNSS antenna will be integrated with other sensors. 
Both GPS and IMU offer velocity parameters and 
hence can be compared with speed log. IMU also 
outputs attitude (heading) and hence can be com-
pared with gyrocompass. 
The Kalman filter enables the bias check, innova-
tion check and residual check. The prerequisite is 
a stable operation of the filter mechanism. As a 
stochastic system, the filter performance is based on 
the modeling of the observation and dynamic model, 
the reasonable a priori knowledge of the observa-
tion and dynamic errors, and most important, the real 
application scenario. It is not a trivial task to adapt 
the filter to all potential unexpected situations, and 
hence it is necessary to test the stability of the filter. 
The stability test can be done either using the in-
ternal parameters of the filter, or by checking the 
compatibility of filter results with the results from 
other stand-alone sensors. 
4.9 Integrity output from a PNT Unit 
According to the previous analysis, the following 
integrity parameters will be supported by a PNT 
Unit. 
 
TABLE 2. OUTPUT FROM A PNT UNIT ___________________________________________________ 
PNT   Plau-  Vali-  Compatibility    Estimated 
Output  sibility dity          Error ___________________________________________________ 
Position   x   x  Redundant GNSS   x 
          Other radio-navigation 
          system  
SOG    x   x  GNSS Doppler, Log,  x 
          IMU, 
COG    x   x  GNSS, IMU  
Attitude   x   x  Compass      x 
          multi-antenna system 
Rate of   x   x  IMU        x 
Turn         heading variation 
          with time 
Time    x   x  Other time sensors 
          internal clock of an INS ___________________________________________________ 
5 SUMMARY 
This paper focuses on a maritime integrated PNT 
Unit as the on-board part of maritime PNT system. 
The aim of the PNT Unit is the robust provision of 
position, navigation and timing information in ac-
cordance with the performance requirements of the 
actual operational region. IALA has introduced the 
term PNT device [2] as “a device using any avail-
able IMO recognized radio navigation systems si-
multaneously to provide the best electronic position 
fix for the ship”. The PNT Unit, proposed in this pa-
per, follows a more general approach in combining 
available radio navigation systems and their augmen-
tation services with other on-board PNT sensors. 
The core of the PNT Unit is a processing system, 
which combines all available PNT sensors. The PNT 
Unit is on the one hand part of the integrated PNT 
System and on the other hand part of the on-board 
INS. 
Focusing on integrity for PNT information we 
have analyzed the state-of-the-art integrity monitor-
ing approaches with respect to the identified user 
needs. Based on this, a demand on the development 
of an enhanced integrity monitoring for all relevant 
PNT data within an integrated PNT Unit can be de-
duced. Such a PNT Unit should use sensor and data 
fusion methods to provide PNT output data and im-
prove integrity monitoring for these output data. For 
both functionalities a high degree of standardization 
is desired in order to achieve comparable and reli-
able results for their harmonized application. 
Subsequently we have introduced a preliminary 
integrity monitoring concept for a PNT Unit which 
also includes additional sensors in order to deliver 
redundancy, backup or contingency functionality. 
Finally it should be stated that this paper can on-
ly be seen as a starting point towards the realization 
of an integrated onboard PNT Unit for maritime ap-
plications. In a next step, after consolidation of the 
architecture, we plan to develop a demonstrator sys-
tem of a PNT Unit. 
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